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Abstract The proposed regulation to reduce bycatch and discarding offinfish
in the southeastern region is a gear modification that excludes finfish from
shrimp trawls. This regulation is analyzed using a simple theoretical model of
a multispecies Jlshery whose bycatch is harvested in a directed fishery con-
sisting of commercial and recreational fishermen. The costless reduction in
bycatch fishing mortality imposed on the multispecies fishery does not result in
an increased stock size for the bycatch fish species or a substantial increase in
its level of harvest. Instead, the fish stock is reallocated from the multispecies
fishery to the fishery directed at the bycatch species causing fishing effort to
expand in the hycatch species fishery that drives the stock size down to the
previously existing equilibrium level. Recreational harvest and effort levels
remain unchanged since the model is linear in effort and the commercial
fishery is given access to the Jlshery first.
Keywords Bycatch, policy analysis, bioeconomic model.
While it is true that a great deal (perhaps the greater part) of what has been
done in the name of "conservation policy" turns out, upon subjection to
economic analysis to be worthless, or worse, it is nevertheless also true that
economic theory can offer a formulation of the conservation objective suf-
ficiently clear and precise to permit the derivation of rational policies in the
future. Such a formulation, like the application of economic theory in other
fields of policy, can be no match for the passionate romanticism with which
the question has been invested in political platforms and public discussion,
but some of the policies of the past and present are sufficiently egregious to
convince even dedicated conservationists of their error or, at least, insuffi-
ciency. Perhaps it is too much to hope that in their hour of confusion and
despair, the protectors of nature might turn to economics for succor, but
even idealistic hopes have the quality of springing eternal. {Gordon 1958)
Introduction
The harvesting offinfish in shrimp fishing operations, known as incidental take or
bycatch, is a complex multidisciplinary and international fisheries management
problem. Countries around the world have been or are addressing this problem in
their commercial shrimp fisheries. Annual estimates offinfish bycatch range from
64 thousand tons for Guyana to 1 million tons in the United States with potential
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benefits from utilization ranging from $28 million to $1,273 billion (FAO and
IDRC, 1982). Less emphasis has been placed on bycatch utilization since the
Sheridan et al. (1984) study found that bycatch utilization could reduce shrimp
biomass by 25%. This change in attitude is seen in the Executive Committee of the
American Fisheries Society policy statement concerning the unnecessary take
and waste of marine resources that supports gear modification regulations (Perra,
1992). The elimination of bycatch from shrimp trawl operations by gear modifi-
cation was the focus of the International Bycatch Conference (Jones, Doolin,
Gravlee, Jones, and Stewart, 1992). Also indicative of this change in approach is
the Office of Management and Budget and the House Appropriations Committee
requirement to evaluate the impacts of turtle excluder/trawl efficiency devices
(TEDs) on shrimp and finflsh catch rates in the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic
(Renaud et aL, 1990).
The reason for the change in attitude is that fmfish bycatch is a significant
domestic fishery management problem. Objective 5 of the Gulf of Mexico shrimp
fishery management plan proposes that finfish bycatch be minimized through gear
development (GMFMC, 1981b). The groundfish fishery management plan cites
the discarding offinfish bycatch in shrimp harvesting operations as a significant
problem to be solved through the development of economically feasible excluder
gear (GMFMC, 1981). The reef fish scientific assessment panel recommended in
March, 1990 that the directed red snapper fishery be closed because the allowable
biological catch was being harvested as a bycatch in the shrimp trawl fishery
(GMFMC, 1992). Finally, an amendment to the 1990 reauthorization of the Mag-
nuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA), section 304(g) In-
cidental Harvest Research, requires a three year research program prior to im-
plementation of finfish bycatch regulations in the shrimp fishery, effectively
blocking regulations until 1994. To satisfy the requirements under this amend-
ment, the "Shrimp Trawl Bycatch Research Requirements" states that the long
run, economic impacts of alternative bycatch reduction measures be determined
(National Marine Fisheries Service, 1991).
Adding to the complexity of the bycatch problem is the incidental take and
subsequent mortality of endangered and threatened marine turtles estimated at
between 11,000 (Henwood and Stuntz. 1987) and 44,000 (National Research
Council. 1990) turtles per year in the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery with an
estimated net loss to the fishery of between $4.5 and $33.3 million depending on
the regulatory scenario employed (Griffin et al., 1988). Also, any increase in
domestic shrimp prices caused by Section 609(b) of Public Law (P.L.) 101-162,
which bans the importation of shrimp unless harvesting nations implement inci-
dental harvest regulations comparable to U.S. standards and rates, would encour-
age the entry of vessels into the domestic shrimp fleet and further exacerbate
existing finfish and marine turtle bycatch problems as well as increasing shrimp
harvesting costs (Keithly et al., 1993).
Given the national concern expressed by the amendment of the MFCMA, the
expressed need by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to determine
the economic impacts on the domestic fishery, the recognition of nontarget spe-
cies bycatch in three fishery management plans, and the American Fisheries
Society bycatch policy as well as the international scope of this problem, the
bioeconomic implications of bycatch reduction regulations need to be determined.
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edge of fish behavior so that bycatch is reduced and then to persuade fishermen
to adopt the gear modifications. This solution implicitly assumes that finfish es-
caping from shrimp trawls will survive to recruit into other commercial and rec-
reational finfish fisheries resulting in increased stock abundance. However, this
technological approach does not consider the impact of this increased abundance
on fishing effort. This critical stock-effort effect is qualitatively examined using a
simple bioeconomic model of a stylized fishery that generates and discards a
bycatch species that is the focus of another directed fishery with commercial and
recreational components. The model is then used to investigate the impact of a
bycatch reduction device on commercial and recreational fishing effort levels in
the fishery for the bycatch species.
The next section of the paper will review the literature on nontarget species
bycatch with the intent of indicating the magnitude of the problem. The bioeco-
nomic simulation model is described next. This section is followed by a discussion
of the implications of management regulations designed to reduce bycatch in fish
harvesting operations. The paper concludes with a summary of the general results
derived from this qualitative discussion of the fishery management problem and
the bioeconomic model.
Literature Review
The numerous studies conducted on bycatch since Lindner (1936) and Gunter
(1936) first commented on the bycatch problem can be divided into two catego-
ries. First are the studies that estimated the amount of protein discarded annually
by the shrimp fleet and the potential for its utilization. The second category
consists of research that concentrates on the species composition of the discards
and the biological impacts of bycatch discards on finfish stock size.
Various estimates from both study categories indicate that a significant level of
finfish bycatch is taken by the fishing effort directed at the Gulf of Mexico shrimp
resource. Blomo and Nichols (1974) found a range of one pound of finfish to a
pound of shrimp in the winter to seven pounds of finfish to a pound of shrimp
landed in the summer and suggested an average of four pounds of finfish for every
pound of shrimp landed. A ten to one ratio of fmfish to shrimp was found in a
study conducted by Chittendon and McEachran (1976). Bryan's (1980) finfish to
shrimp ratio was three to one. In 1985, Pellegrin et al. found finfish to shrimp
ratios that ranged from 2 to I to as high as 21.1 to 1. Usually, the bycatch is not
in a form that has market value to the fishermen. This portion of the bycatch is
discarded and is not available for recruitment into the commercial or recreational
finfish fishery (Pellegrin et ai. 1985).
The effect of bycatch on finfish stocks was initially addressed by Nichols et al.
(1987). The estimated bycatch of red snapper, king mackerel, and Spanish mack-
erel was found to be comparable to or exceed the average recreational catch. In
an analysis based on Nichols et al. (1987), Powers et al. (1987) concluded that the
elimination of red snapper from the shrimp bycatch would result in a ninety
percent increase in this fish stock available to recreational and commercial finfish
fishermen. In updated (Nichols et al.. 1990) and revised (Nichols and Pellegrin,
1992) analyses, annual finfish bycatch in the shrimp fishery has been estimated at
between 700 million and 1.7 billion pounds.
Studies have been conducted to detennine the economic impacts of discardedJ. M. Ward
bycatch. Blomo and Nichols (1974) found that if the finfish resources were utilized
instead of discarded, then the total bycatch of trawl fish (368 million pounds in the
western Gulf of Mexico) could move through the fish meal and oil reduction
market with a negligible price affect. Although Anderson (1993) and Arnason
(1993) conclusions differ, their respective analyses suggest that the costs of dis-
carding bycatch can significantly affect the equilibrium stock size under different
initial assumptions. Since the shrimp fishery has historically landed commercially
valuable species of finfish, determining the conditions under which Incentives
exist to discard marketable finfish is important. That is, management regulations
designed to reduce bycatch discards should avoid creating incentives to discard
commercially or recreational!y valuable finfish.
Bioeconomic Model
A stylized bioeconomic model is developed to determine the magnitude and di-
rection of change in the affected fisheries from proposed bycatch reduction reg-
ulations. Discarding in commercial fishing operations occurs because the reten-
tion of the discarded species is prohibited by regulation, the discarded species has
a nonmarket value or has no commercial value, or a valuable species is discarded
to make room for a more valuable species. Finfish species that have no commer-
cial value, such as juveniles, or a nonmarket value, derived from the recreational
fishery for the adult species, are discarded immediately by the commercial fish-
ermen as are species whose retention is prohibited by regulation. Less valued
species are discarded to make room for more valued species primarily as a func-
tion of trip length and the vessel's hold capacity (Clark, 1985). The discarding of
the juvenile finfish bycatch or incidental catch is essentially a problem of a mul-
tispecies fishery in which only one species has value to the fisherman. The anal-
ysis is complicated by the existence of a directed fishery that exploits the adult
stock of the discarded juvenile species. This adult finfish has market value in the
commercial finfish fishery and a nonmarket value in the recreational finfish fish-
ery.
Multispecies Fishery Model
The fishery economics literature normally assumes a generic gear that harvests a
mix of species where the population dynamics can be expressed in the simple two
species case as
X = F(X) - qxExX
Y = G(Y) - qy,E,Y (1)
where F(X) is the growth function of species X,
G(Y) is the growth function of the bycatch species Y,
q^E^X is the harvest level h^ of species X in the fishery for species X,
qyxExY is the harvest level h^^ of species Y in the fishery for species X,
X is the biomass of species X,Stock Conservation Through Gear Modification 231
Y is the biomass of the bycatch species Y,
q^ is the catchability coefficient of the gear for species X in the
fishery for species X.
q^x is the catchability coefficient of the gear for species Y in the
fishery for species X, and
Ex is the level of total fishing effort for both species in the fishery
for species X.
Equation (1) assumes that the two species are ecologically independent and that
the growth functions are positive, increase at a decreasing rate with respect to
stock size, and are equal to zero when stock size is zero or at its maximum
environmental carrying capacity (K), i.e.
F(X) > 0, F"(X) < 0, and F'(0) = F(K) = 0 for 0 =s X ^ K.
G(Y) > 0, G"(Y) < 0, and G'(0) = G(K) - 0 for 0 ^ Y ^ K.
More realistic, but complex, models allow for species interdependence through
competition and predation in the population dynamics (Larkin, 1966 and Clark,
1979), but this model is sufficient to present the basics of the problem.
Bioeconomic equilibrium under open access conditions can be characterized
by setting net revenue IT equal to zero;
77 = P,h, -\- Pyhyx - CxEx = 0 (2)
where P^ is the exvessel price for species X,
Py is the exvessel price for species Y and is set equal to zero when the
bycatch species Y is discarded in the fishery for species X, and
c^ is the unit cost of fishing effort.
Assuming a logistic growth function for species X and Y and that the total fishing
effort level is determined solely by the high valued species X, then the total
landings of the target species is:
(3)
where r^ is the intrinsic growth rate and
Kj is the environmental carrying capacity (i = x, y, and yx).




where an increase in the exvessel price P^ for species X, ceteris paribus, will
initially increase the bycatch h^,^ of species Y and then cause it to decline as
the stock of species Y is depleted.'
' A percentage of the discarded bycatch could be assumed to survive. That is, instead of
100 percent mortality, some fixed mortality less than 100 percent could be assumed. When
factored into the computer model, this reduced bycatch mortality caused fishing effort inJ. M, Ward
Commercial Bycatch Fishery
A directed fishery for the bycatch species Y that employs a fishing gear that is
species specific or operates in areas that do not support populations of species X
is incorporated into the model. The population dynamics of species Y for this
alternative directed fishery can be represented by
where Gy(Y) is the growth function of species Y,
Eye is the level of commercial fishing effort directed at species Y,
Eyr is the level of recreational fishing effort directed at species Y,
qyc is the catchability coefficient for the directed commercial
fishery for species Y,
qyr is the catchability coefficient for the directed recreational
fishery
hyx is the level of bycatch of species Y in the fishery for species X,
hyc = ^ygEygY is the level of harvest for the directed commercial
fishery for species Y.
hyr = (^yrEypY is the level of harvest for the
directed recreational fishery for species Y.
Equation (5) incorporates a stock effect, caused by the bycatch (hy^) of species Y
in the fishery for species X, in the population dynamics for species Y. In addition,
the directed fishery for species Y is assumed to have a recreational component as
is common in many finfish fisheries in the southeastern region.
Assuming a logistic growth function for species Y, that the bioeconomic equi-
librium for the commercial fishery can be represented as in equation (2), and for
expositional purposes that the recreational fishery does not exist (Ey^ = 0), then
the equilibrium fishing effort level, harvest level, and stock size associated with
the directed commercial fishery for species Y can be represented by:
the directed fishery for species Y to increase by a smaller amount than under the 100%
bycatch mortality scenario when a bycatch reduction device is adopted by the fishery that
generates the bycatch. However, equihbrium stock size for species Y was unaffected. A
positive price for the landed bycatch would require explicitly modelling adult and juvenile
growth functions for the bycatch species. Equation (4) implies that fishing effort for species
X would increase with a positive price for species Y. The result would be that fishing effort
in the multispecies fishery that generates the bycatch would be higher than in the model
presented in this paper. The adoption of a bycatch reduction device would eliminate this
landed bycatch as well as the discarded bycatch. the finfish would recruit into the directed
commercial and recreational fishery for the bycatch species, and eifort for species Y would
increase leading to the same equilibrium stock size for species Y before and after the
introduction ofthe management regulation. This suggested modification would introduce
some interesting effects for the path to the new equilibrium since the recruitment of adult
finfish would occur immediately while juvenile finfish would recruit into the commercial
and recreational finfish tlshery for the bycatch species at a slower rate. However, this




where Cyc is the unit cost of commerical fishing effort in the fishery for
species Y.
Under the conditions of a relatively elastic demand (Emerson, 1988) for the fish
species Y and an open access resource, equation (8) indicates that the elimination
of bycatch in the multispecies fishery does not directly affect the population
equilibrium stock size of species Y. Equations (6) and (7) indicate that both the
fishing effort Ey^ and harvest hy^. levels in the directed commercial fishery for
species Y are directly affected by the level of bycatch in the multispecies fishery
for species X.
Recreational Bycatch Fishery
Recreational fisherman obtain utility (U) from harvesting the finfish resource.
Following McConnell and Sutinen (1979), the bioeconomic equilibrium for the
recreational fishery in this simple model can be expressed as
U = = 0 (9)
where Vy is the marginal value derived from the recreationally caught fish
(i.e. the willingness to pay for the last fish caught) and
Cyr is the unit cost of recreational fishing effort.
As in the case for the commercial fishery,total recreational fishing effort (Eyr),
the level of recreational harvest (hy^), and equilibrium stock size (Y) can be
derived by assuming that no commercial fishery for species Y exists (Ey^. = 0).
1 -
-yr (10)




Under these conditions of a relatively elastic recreational demand for the fish
species Y and a common property resource, the elimination of bycatch in the
multispecies fishery does not directly affect the population equilibrium stock size
of species Y in equation (12). However, the level of fishing effort, equation (10),234 J. M. Ward
and the level of harvest, equation (12), in the directed recreational fishery for
species Y are affected by the level of bycatch in the multispecies fishery for
species X.
Recreational-Commercial Allocation
In an open access fishery directed at the bycatch species Y, the resource is
allocated between the commercial and recreational user groups where profits from
commercial fishing are equal to the utility derived from recreational fishing.^
Solving this expression for the equilibrium stock size results in
(13)
Equation (13) implicitly defines the allocation of the stock according to equa-
tions (8) and (12), fishing effort levels according to equations (6) and (10), and
harvest levels according to equations (7) and (11).^ Equation (13) indicates that the
resource will be allocated between the commercial and recreational fishermen
when their relative cost/value ratios are equal. Since the relative values of these
two uses of the fishery resource are exogenously determined in this analysis, a
reduction in bycatch will not affect the equilibrium stock size of species Y or the
allocation between the commercial and recreational fisheries.
Discussion
The static equilibrium relationships derived in the previous section are used to
generate the graphs in Figures 1 to 4.'* Quadrant 1 in each of the figures represents
the open access supply curve S^^ and the market demand curve D that determine
the equilibrium market price P and the harvest level H and, in Figures 1 and 2, the
bycatch level Hy for the fishery. Quadrant II is the price-population size curve SS
that relates price P to stock size X or Y. Quadrant UI presents the population
equilibrium curve PE that relates fishing effort levels E to stock size X or Y.
Quadrant IV contains the sustainable yield curve SY(E) that relates fishing effort
levels E to harvest levels H and, in Figures 1 and 2, to bycatch levels Hy. Using
these graphs, the impacts on the directed commercial and recreational fishery for
the bycatch species Y caused by a regulation imposing a bycatch reduction device
on the species X fishery can be determined.
^ This is a static version of the dynamic model developed by McConnell and Sutinen (1979)
for allocating a fishery resource between recreational and commercial user groups.
^ These static results correspond to the dynamic results of McConnell and Sutinen (1979)
and Bishop and Samples (1980) for commercial and recreational allocations of a fishery
resource, except that they now incorporate the influence of the discarded juvenile bycatch
in a multispecies fishery.
* The mathematical notation used earlier in the paper has been simplified to improve the
readability of the graphs.Stock Conservation Through Gear Modification 235
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Figure 1. Multispecies Fishery Before Gear Modification
Before the bycatch reduction device gear modification, the multispecies fish-
ery in Figure I produces a level of fishing effort E that is determined by exvessel
price P, harvesting cost c^, and abundance of species X. In quadrant I, the inter-
section of market demand D and the open access supply curve Sj,,, determine an
equilibrium price P for the equilibrium harvest level H in the species X directed
fishery. Since the bycatch species Y has no value to the fisherman, the equilib-
rium bycatch level Hy is determined by the open access bycatch supply curve S^ab
at exvessel price P for species X. In quadrant IV, the sustainable yield curve
SY(E) determines the harvest level H produced by the fishing effort level E that
corresponds to the equilibrium exvessel price P. Similarly, the bycatch level Hy is
determined by the intersection of fishing effort E on the sustainable yield curve for
the bycatch species SY(E)j,. Since the bycatch species Y is assumed to have no
market value, it is discarded and does not affect the fishing effort level E in the
fishery for species X. However, the equilibrium stock size ofthe bycatch species
Y is determined by the fishing effort level H for species X in quadrant III on the
population equilibrium curve PE,,. The equilibrium stock size for species X is also
determined by the fishing effort level E for species X on the population equilib-
rium curve PE in quadrant III.
In Figure 2, a bycatch reduction device is installed in the fishing gear of the
multispecies fishery for species X that generates the bycatch of species Y. This
device reduces bycatch mortality for species Y by sixty percent without affecting23 J. M. Ward
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' Figure 2. Multispecies Fishery After Gear Modification
fishing mortality or harvesting costs for species X.^ As a resuh, the harvest level
of species X remains unchanged at H, but the level of bycatch declines substan-
tially as depicted by a comparison of Hy in quadrant I of Figures I and 2. The
equilibrium stock size X is unchanged for the multispecies fishery, but the bycatch
species stock size level Y increases in quadrant III of Figure 2 relative to its level
in Figure 1.
In Figure 3, the impact of the bycatch reduction device on the commercial
sector of the species Y fishery is illustrated. Prior to the adoption of the bycatch
reduction device in the multispecies fishery, the equilibrium level of harvest is H,
the equilibrium fishing effort level is E, and the equilibrium stock size is Y in
quadrants I, IV, and III of Figure 3, respectively. With the mandated adoption of
the bycatch reduction device in the multispecies fishery, bycatch levels decline in
Figure 2, and recruitment into the bycatch species fishery increases. As a result,
the fishing effort levels in quadrant IV of Figure 3 increases from E to E' due to
the outward shift in the sustainable yield curve from SY(E) to SY(E'). A corre-
sponding increase in the open access supply curve from S^^ to S^^' in quadrant I
causes harvest levels to increase from H to H'. However, the stock conservation
goal for the bycatch species Y is not achieved since the increased fishing effort
maintains the stock at its original equilibrium level in quadrant III. Since the
' The 60 percent reduction in the parameter value of the catchability coefficient qy^ in the
computer program that generates Figure 2 corresponds to the bycatch reductions desired
by fishery managers.Stock Conservation Through Gear Modification 237
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Figure 3. Commercial Fishery for Bycatch Species
bycatch reduction device does not affect prices, costs, or gear catchability in the
commercial fishery for bycatch species Y according to equation (8), the equilib-
rium stock size is unchanged at point Y in quadrant III of Figure 3.
In Figure 4, the impact of the bycatch reduction device on the recreational
fishery is illustrated. In this case, the result is hardly noticeable when compared
to the commercial fishery in Figure 3. This occurs because the commercial fishery
for species Y harvests the increased abundance of fish before the recreational
fishery has an opportunity to exploit the resource. Had the recreational fishery
been given access to the resource first, the commercial fishery would have re-
mained relatively unchanged.
Conclusions
Future research will incorporate a number of the caveats that accompany this
qualitative analysis of the bycatch problem. First, these results are based on a
logistic growth function. Direction of change is probably the same for any growth
function that satisfies the second order conditions of the logistic function, but the
magnitude of the change could be different. Second, stock recruitment effects are
ignored in this analysis. Third, the results presented and discussed in this paper
depend on a fishery facing relatively elastic demand for the fish species (Emerson,
1988). Relatively inelastic demand functions would result in reductions in fishing
effort and increases in stock size as bycatch is reduced in the multispecies fishery238 J. M. Ward
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Figure 4. Recreational Fishery for Bycatch Species
(Blomo and Nichols, 1974). Fourth, the treatment of fishing effort as a linear
variable in the model generates some unrealistic results for the reallocation of the
fish stock between recreational and commercial fishermen. An indirect cost func-
tion, that is nearing completion for the shrimp and reef fish fisheries, could be
used to correct this shortcoming of the model. Fifth, the model representing the
recreational fishery for the bycatch species could be modified to account for kept
versus released catch. Sixth, fishing gear catchability could be modeled as a
function of stock size. Finally, optimal control techniques could be employed to
determine the long run paths from equilibrium point to equilibrium point so that
the discounted present value of net benefits can be calculated for each proposed
management scenario, such as total allowable catches for the recreational and
commercial bycatch species fishery, individual transferable quotas, or closed fish-
ing seasons or areas.
However, the essence of the bycatch problem is clarified by using this simple
modelling approach. Management regulations that attempt to reduce bycatch lev-
els in one fishery may have unexpected effects in other fisheries. Reducing the
bycatch fishing mortality in the multispecies fishery does not result in increased
stock size of the bycatch fish species or substantial increases in its level of harvest
as has been suggested in Powers et al. (1987). Instead, it reallocates the fish stock
from the multispecies fishery to the fishery for the bycatch species. This increase
in abundance expands fishing effort in the fishery for the bycatch species. This
expansion of fishing effort drives the stock size down to the equilibrium level thatStock Conservation Through Gear Modification 239
existed prior to the reduction in bycatch in the multispecies fishery with modest
increases in harvest levels. Obviously, if the level of harvest in the directed
fishery for the bycatch species increases slightly with a substantial increase in
fishing effort, then the costs associated with this harvest level are higher than they
would be under an exclusive property rights management scenario. That is, the
same level of harvest can be produced in Figure 3 with a lower effort level
resulting in a lower harvesting cost and a higher stock size.
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